It is known that an increasing number of telecommunication service operators intend to acquire new customers by launching massive advertising campaigns in order to announce to potential users the benefits they would have if they became their clients. These benefits can be of the one-off financial (for example a sign-up bonus), recurring (for example a discount on any subscription tariffs) or tariff-related (for example, tariff discounts for outbound calls).
In some cases, the incentives also relate to inbound calls; the operator's subscriber is granted a discount/bonus/credit on the basis of the number of calls/messages or of the duration of the calls/size of the messages received from callers.
The worldwide user base of these services is served by an extremely large number of operators, which compete to acquire users but at the same time, generally but not exclusively, interconnect their own networks with each other so that the user of one operator can reach the user of any other operator and vice versa. Each operator assigns to its own users the numbers/addresses by means of which said users can be reached by other users. Generally, each operator establishes the tariffs for the calls originating from its own users toward other users; if the calling party and the called party are not served by the same operator, the operator of the calling party must pay to the operator of the called party a tariff for termination of the call on the network of said operator.
The dominant compensation mechanism among operators is known as Transit Model and entails that each operator establishes the tariff charged to other operators for terminating calls toward said operator's own users, the so-called Interconnection Tariff.
For example, an Operator A assigns to its users the numbers at which they can be reached. Operator A sets the tariffs applied to its own users for calls toward other users, and finally Operator A negotiates with operators B, C and D the Interconnection Tariffs that it will have to grant them in order to terminate calls toward users of B, C and D, and the Interconnection Tariffs that B, C and D shall have to grant to Operator A in order to terminate calls to users of A.
Termination Tariffs are negotiated among Operators and/or set by regulatory bodies. Termination toward terminals of mobile telephone networks tends to be much more expensive than termination toward terminals of fixed telephone networks, which in turn tends to be more expensive than termination toward VOIP terminals. In this last case, the called user in fact already bears the cost of the connection of his own terminal to the Internet, and therefore the termination cost borne by an Operator which is also already connected to the Internet is substantially nil.
The Termination Tariff toward a given fixed or mobile telephone network can be a single tariff or can be differentiated into two values, one for peak periods and one for evening periods and holidays. This is generally the only element of flexibility of the total amount of the tariff: there are no mechanisms for changing from call to call the Interconnection Tariff toward a given Number at a given time.
In some cases, the mechanism for compensation among Operators is based on the Origination Regime, whereby the tariff applied to a calling party who is a subscribed user of a third-party operator toward one's numbers is decided by the operator on which the call terminates, which compensates the operator of the calling party for carrying the call within his network. The tariff applied for this transport is typically independent of the tariff applied to the calling party. Since the calling party generally does not have an existing direct relation with the operator of the called party, this last operator must almost necessarily delegate invoicing to the operator of the calling party, which instead has by definition an existing relation with the calling party.
It should be noted that also in this case, the tariff applied to the calling party is inflexible: at a given time, only one tariff can be applied for calls toward a given number and it is not possible to vary the tariff on a call by call basis.
Moreover, in contrast with the Termination Regime, the Origination Regime is not universally accepted by Operators but is generally used within individual countries and only for particular types of traffic, such as for example dial-up Internet access by means of nongeographical numbers.
Since customers of telecommunication services are served by a plurality of operators, inevitably some of the calls originate from an operator different from the operator on which they terminate. It is therefore evident that an operator has no way to control at all times and at will the tariff applied to the calling party, since in the case of Termination Tariff it is the operator of the calling party that decides, whereas in the less frequent case of the Origination Regime it is not forseen for the called party operator the possibility to vary tariff applied to the caller a given time, on a call by call basis.
In addition to the practical reasons cited above, which prevent changing at a given time, on a call by call basis, the tariff applied to the calling party, in many countries there are regulatory limitations, since it is required the end user be able to determine in advance, on the basis of the called number and of the day/time of day, the tariff for reaching a certain number. These limitations prevent changing at will, at a given time, on a call by call basis, the tariff applied to reach a given number.
There are know mechanisms for interoperability among networks of Operators that come close to achieving this goal. For example, in a case in which the calling and called party are served by two different Operators, it is known how to charge the calls to the called party instead of the calling party (toll-free numbers, collect calling) or how to split the cost between the calling party and the called party (service know in Italy as “addebito ripartito” or “shared cost”), or how to charge the costs to a third party, which in some cases pays for the call in exchange for the insertion of advertising messages. In other cases, mechanisms are described for crediting part of the cost of the call to third parties with the goal of providing systems for payment to third parties by charging the telephone bill of the calling party (premium numbers).
However, none of these mechanisms allows for example to vary arbitrarily the tariff applied for a given call to a given number at a given time when the call transits from one Operator to another Operator.
However, an Operator might have the goal and interest in influencing on a call by call basis the tariff applied at a given time to customers of other Operators who call one of its subscribed users. An operator might even find it convenient to establish a direct relationship with users of other operators.
Moreover, this feature is required in order to optimally provide various services, including for example the Follow Me Unique Number service, which is already known.
A Subscriber of the Follow Me Unique Number service generally can be reached by means of a plurality of terminals, such as for example a fixed telephone at home, a fixed telephone in the office, a cellular mobile telephone, a fixed VOIP telephone connected to the Internet by means of a fixed line, a PC provided with a VOIP client connected to the Internet over a fixed line or wireless link, a mobile telephone or a PDA provided with a VOIP client connected to the Internet via a wireless link.
Thanks to the Follow Me Unique Number service, the Subscriber gives his callers a single Unique Number instead of a Number for each of his terminals. Following a call to the Unique Number, the provider of the Follow Me Unique Number service might determine on which terminals the user is reachable at that given moment and select for example the terminal that entails the lowest cost.
The cost to reach the called party might therefore vary considerably in each instance, but the inflexibility described above does not allow the provider of the Follow Me Unique Number service to vary at a given moment the tariff applied to calling parties in accordance with the actual cost incurred to reach the called party, so that the provider may share with the calling party at least part of the saving realized when reaching the called party.
In all the cases of known systems, when the calling party is not a customer of the same operator that provides the Follow Me Unique Number service, the provider of the Follow Me Unique Number service in fact has no way to change the tariff applied to the calling party on a call by call basis at a given moment toward a given number. Assuming that the Transit Model is used, which maximizes the number of operators with which the Follow Me Unique Number service provider can interoperate, the operator will presumably set the Interconnection Tariff for the number ranges related to Unique Numbers at a value high enough to cover the cost of delivering the call to the recipient in the most expensive case (for example, delivery on a mobile telephone), or at least higher than the statistical average of costs, but it has no way to modify the tariff applied to the calling party when it is possible to reach the recipient on a less expensive terminal. As already noted, this limitation cannot be overcome even by adopting the origination regime, which would entail the additional disadvantage of limiting significantly the number of operators with which it would be possible to interoperate.
One possible solution to this problem and in general to the problem of affecting the tariff applied by a third-party operator to contact one's own clients, on a call by call basis, is to implement this function in the mechanisms for interconnection among operators.
However, this would require an agreement among all the Operators which intend to provide this service to each other and would require implementing the function itself.
It is therefore necessary to improve the known system for the management of telecommunication services with particular regard to tariffing in order to make it more flexible as well as effective and inexpensive.